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ARTICLES
THE NEW YORK STATE GAINS TAX-
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court allows states broad powers of taxation as
an inherent attribute of state sovereignty.' Viewed by the Su-
preme Court as the primary repository of the taxing power,2 state
legislatures possess great freedom to set classifications 8 deciding
which individuals or groups will be affected by a tax.4 However,
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution 5 is
Hoge v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 348, 355 (1878). "The power of taxa-
tion is an attribute of sovereignty, and is essential to every independent government.
Stripped of this power, it must perish." Id.; see Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526
(1959); International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 444-45
(1944); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 366 (1939); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 429 (1819); People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 160 N.Y. 225, 236 (1899), afJd, 176 U.S.
335 (1900).
£ In Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 239 (1919), the Court stated:
The taxing power of the States is primarily vested in their legislatures, deriving their
authority from the people. When a state legislature acts within the scope of its au-
thority it is responsible to the people, and the right to change the agents to whom
they have entrusted the power is ordinarily deemed a sufficient check upon its abuse.
Id.; see Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526 (1959); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v.
Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285, 292 (1935); Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Say.
Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 295 (1898); Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237
(1889); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG. HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 395 (2d ed.
1983).
S See Southern Package Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 164 So. 45, 47 (Miss. 1935). "Classi-
fication ... is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars and differ from other things in the same particulars." Id.
' Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1889). The states are allowed flexi-
bility in designing reasonable taxation schemes and exemptions; they can vary taxes upon
different trades, professions, products and property. Id. Hostile discriminations against par-
ticular persons and classes are to be avoided. Id.; see Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959); Tax
Comm'r v.Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 159
(1930); Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114, 121 (1910); Magoun v. Illinois Trust
and Say. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293 (1898).
" U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amend-
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offended by classifications that are arbitrary and capricious, rest
on no rational basis and bear no reasonable relation to the pur-
pose of a statute.6
On March 29, 1983, the New York State Legislature enacted
Article 31-B of the New York Tax Law (the gains tax).7 With a
few exceptions,8 all real property transfers in New York State,
when the gross consideration exceeds one million dollars, are sub-
ject to the tax.9 Recently, the constitutionality of the gains tax has
been questioned under the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States and New York State Constitutions."
The New York gains tax was enacted as part of a revenue bill to
provide funds for the 1983-1984 state budget.11 The tax has en-
gendered problems of interpretation and administration including
questions concerning mortgages,12 mortgage foreclosures," capi-
ment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. The New
York Constitution contains a similar equal protection clause: "No person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof." N.Y. CONst. art. I,
§ 11.
' See Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). "[C]lassification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike." Id.: see Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32,
37 (1928).
7 Ch. 15, § 181, [19831 N.Y. Laws 134 (codified as amended in N.Y. TAX LAW § 1440-
1449 (McKinney Supp. 1986)). The gains tax resembles an earlier tax imposed on 10% of
gains derived from the transfer of industrial and commercial real property in New York
City. Compare Ch. 487, § 1422, [19811 N.Y. Laws 1745, repealed by Ch. 57, § 1, [1982]
N.Y. Laws 1359 with N.Y. TAX LAW § 1441 (McKinney Supp. 1986). The present gains tax
levies a 10% tax on gains derived from the transfer of real property within New York
State. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1441 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
' See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1443 (McKinney Supp. 1986); see also infra note 30.
' See N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1441, 1443 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
'0 See Trump v. Chu, 65 N.Y.2d 20- 24, 478 N.E.2d 971, 974, 489 N.Y.S.2d 455, 458,
appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 285 (1985).
" See New York State Assembly Debates, Act of March 28, 1983, ch. 15 at 30. At the
time of its passage, the gains tax was expected to raise revenues of approximately ninety
million dollars per year. Id. That annual figure was exceeded in the month of December,
1985, alone. See Morris & Golkin, Impact of Transfer Gains Tax on Cooperatives, Condomini-
urns, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 1986, at 1, col. 3. Revenues from the tax now yield over five hun-
dred inillion dollars annually, 80% of which is derived from real property transactions in
New York City. Id. Currently, an effort to increase the tax from 10% to 12.5% for New
York City transactions is receiving favorable consideration from Mayor Koch and Gover-
nor Cuomo. Id.
2 See Ch. 15, § 181, [1983] N.Y. Laws 134, 136 (codified as amended in N.Y. TAX LAW
§ 1440.7 (McKinney Supp. 1986)). Section 1440.7 now excludes from tax liability the crea-
tion, modification, extension, spreading, severance, consolidation, assignment, transfer, re-
lease or satisfaction of a mortgage. Id.; see also Underberg, McCarroll & Rubenstein, Real
Property Taxation, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 609, 612-13 (1984).
"3 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1440.7 (McKinney Supp. 1986). Under section 1440.7, a mort-
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tal improvements and "soft costs,"'1 4 the pre-transfer audit proce-
dure'6 and partnership transfers.'6 This article will begin by ex-
amining key provisions of the gains tax. After analyzing the
constitutional implications of the tax, possible legislative solutions
will be offered.
gage foreclosure is deemed to be a transfer of real property. Id.; see also Rifkin, New York's
Real Property Gains Tax and Mortgage Foreclosure, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1984, at 48, col. 1.
The original statute provided little guidance as to the responsibilities of the parties in-
volved in mortgage foreclosures. See Ch. 15, § 181, [1983] N.Y. Laws 134, 139-40 (codified
as amended in N.Y. TAx LAW § 1447.3(b) (McKinney Supp. 1986)); see also New York State
Dep't of Taxation and Finance, Publication 588, Questions and Answers - Gains Tax on Real
Property Transfers (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter Publication 588].
Publication 588 is a pamphlet published by the New York State Department of Taxation
and Finance interpreting various aspects of the gains tax. The New York State Department
of Taxation and Finance has interpreted N.Y. TAx LAW § 1447.3(b) as exempting transfer-
ees (successful bidders at a foreclosure sale) from any personal liability for gains taxes due
from transferors (defaulting mortgagors). Publication 588, supra, at 22 (Q.59(b)). The de-
faulting mortgagor must furnish a statement of no tax due or tentative assessment to a
referee prior to the foreclosure sale. Id. at 21 (Q.59(a)). Defaulting mortgagors who fail to
supply this assessment will have their gains computed for purposes of the gains tax with
zero as the original purchase price. Id. The referee will then pay the gains tax to the extent
funds remain after payments to lienholders. Id. Any excess proceeds are then paid to the
court for disposition. Id. If there are not sufficient proceeds to pay the gains tax, the de-
faulting mortgagor remains liable for payment. Id. at 22 (Q.59(c)).
14 See Underberg, McCarroll & Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 613. Article 31-B provides
no definition for a capital improvement leading to speculation as to whether "soft costs,"
such as professional fees, were to be included in the term. Id. The New York State Depart-
ment of Taxation and Finance has narrowly defined a capital improvement as "an improve-
ment, a betterment, or an addition made to real property which: 1) is intended to be per-
manently affixed to the real property, and 2) has a useful life substantially beyond the year
following installation." Publication 588, supra note 13, at 5 (Q.16).
15 See Frankel, New York State Gains Tax On Real Property Purchases, N.Y.L.J., June 15,
1983, at 1, col. 2. All real estate transfers with consideration of $500,000 or more and
which are not owner-occupied residences must be processed through the New York State
Department of Taxation and Finance before they can be completed. Id. at 24, col. 3. The
Department will then furnish a tentative assessment of the amount of tax due within
twenty days. Id. A reasonably correct computation of the amount of gain in a complex real
estate transaction is difficult to estimate within such a short period of time. Id.
16 See Cohen, A Guide to the Real Property Gains Tax, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 13, 1985, at 23, col. 1
(discussing difficulty of calculating partner's profit share in partnership when partnership
interests are sold). Though partnership interests may change over the course of the part-
nership, there is no concise answer as to how changes in partnership profit share should be
calculated for the gains tax. Id. at 30, cols. 3-4. A partner who acquires a controlling inter-
est in a partnership which owns real property in New York State is subject to the gains tax.
N.Y. TAx LAw §§ 1440.2, 1440.7 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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I. KEY PROVISIONS OF THE GAINS TAX
A gains tax is imposed when real property17 or an interest in
real property 8 located within New York State is transferred. 9 A
ten percent levy is imposed on the gain 20 which is the excess of
consideration over the original purchase price of the property."l
17 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1440.6 (McKinney Supp. 1986). Real property means "every estate or
right... in lands... including buildings, structures and other improvements in leaseholds
which are located in whole or part within [New York State]." Id.; see also Publication 588,
supra note 13, at I (Q.2).
is N.Y. TAx LAW § 1440.4 (McKinney Supp. 1986). An "interest in real property" in-
cludes "title in fee, a leasehold, a beneficial interest, an encumbrance, a transfer of devel-
opment rights or any other interest with the right to use or occupancy of real property or
the right to receive.. . income derived from real property ... [and] an option or contract
to purchase real property." Id.; see Publication 588, supra note 13, at 1 (Q.3).
11 N.Y. TAx LAW § 1440.7 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
"Transfer of real property" means the transfer ... of any interest in real property
by any method including ... sale, exchange, assignment, surrender, mortgage fore-
closure, transfer in lieu of foreclosure, option, trust indenture, taking by eminent
domain, conveyance upon liquidation or by a receiver or acquisition of a controlling
interest in any entity with an interest in real property.
Id.; see Publication 588, supra note 13, at I (Q.4).
Section 1440.2 provides a definition of a "controlling interest":
"Controlling interest" means (i) in the case of a corporation, either fifty percent or
more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of such corporation,
or fifty percent or more of the capital, profits or beneficial interest in such voting
stock of such corporation, and (ii) in the case of a partnership, association, trust or
other entity, fifty percent or more of the capital, profits or beneficial interest in such
partnership, association, trust or other entity.
Id.; see also Publication 588, supra note 13, at 17 (Q.'s 44-45(b)) (New York State Depart-
ment of Taxation and Finance will examine transaction to determine if group of individu-
als is acting in concert in acquiring controlling interest). If various purchasers are deemed
to interact so that one purchaser influences or controls the action of another they will be
deemed to be acting in concert; if they acquire fifty percent or more of an entity the trans-
action will be taxable. Id. For example, if a parent and a wholly-owned subsidiary each
purchase a 30% interest in an entity, the Department of Taxation and Finance will deem
the parent to have purchased a 60% interest and the gains tax is triggered. Id. (Q.45(b)).
20 N.Y. TAx LAW § 1441 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
21 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1440.3 (McKinney Supp. 1986); see Publication 588, supra note 13, at
2-3 (Q.8). "'Gain' is the difference between the consideration for the transfer of real prop-
erty and the original purchase price of such property, where the consideration exceeds the
original purchase price." N.Y. TAX LAW § 1440.3 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
"Consideration" is the price paid for the real property including interest and also includ-
ing payment for an option or contract to use real property. N.Y. TAx LAW § 1440.1(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1986). It includes money, property or anything of value paid by the
transferor including the amount of any mortgage loan or other encumbrance. Id.; see Pub-
lication 588, supra note 13, at 4 (Q.15(a)).
"Original purchase price" is the consideration paid or required to be paid to acquire the
real property plus the consideration paid or required to be paid for capital improvements
to the property and fees paid to dispose of the property. N.Y. TAx LAW § 1440.5(a) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1986); see Publication 588, supra note 13, at 4 (Q.14). Certain pre-acquisition
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Costs allowable as part of a property's original purchase price are
divided by the New York State Department of Taxation and Fi-
nance into the following categories: (a) the price paid to acquire
an interest in real property;22 (b) amounts paid for particular
"capital improvements" to property;23 and (c) costs clearly associ-
ated with the construction of a real estate project."4 "Soft costs"
related to the marketing and maintenance of real property are not
included in a property's original purchase price. 5 Transfers pur-
suant to mortgage foreclosures, condemnation proceedings, devel-
opment rights, air rights and bankruptcy liquidations are taxable
exchanges .2  Also taxable in some instances are corporate merg-
ers, 7 and dividends in the form of real property. 8 Certain ex-
costs directly related to the New York real property may be included in original purchase
price. Id. at 4-5 (Q. 15(b)). Examples of such costs are legal, architectural and other profes-
sional fees, studies, payments to obtain an option to acquire real property, certain closing
costs and real estate taxes. Id. at 5 (Q.15(b)). Excluded costs that cannot be included in real
purchase price include interest paid on a loan whose proceeds were used to acquire the real
property, interest paid on a note or bond secured by a true purchase money mortgage, tax
abatement fee and title closing gratuities. See id. (Q. 15(c)).
22 See Publication 588, supra note 13, at 4 (Q. I5(a)). The "price paid to acquire an inter-
est in real property" includes the amount of money or property used to acquire the prop-
erty interest including a mortgage or lien. Id.
23 See id. at 5 (Q.16(a)). A "capital improvement" is "an improvement, a modification, a
betterment, or an addition made to real property which: 1) is intended to be permanently
affixed to the real property, and 2) has a useful life substantially beyond the year following
installation." Id. Examples of costs associated with the cost of capital improvements include
surveying fees, construction equipment rental and excavation costs. See id.
" See id. at 6 (Q.16(c)). Construction period costs include accounting fees, construction
lender appraisals, construction period real property taxes, mortgage recording tax, con-
struction period insurance and construction period security. Id. Expenses incurred to main-
tain property are not included in construction period costs. Id. at 7 (Q.16(e)). However,
some maintenance expenses are considered capital improvements, e.g., installation of en-
tire flooring, complete roof replacement and initial painting for a new structure. Id.
" See N.Y. TAx LAW § 1440.5(a) (McKinney Supp. 1986). Original purchase price in-
cludes amounts paid by the transferor for legal, engineering and architectural fees in-
curred in selling real property. N.Y. TAx LAW § 1440.5(a) (McKinney Supp. 1986); see also
Publication 588, supra note 13, at 7 (Q.17); Underberg, McCarroll & Rubenstein, supra
note 12, at 613 (marketing costs such as advertising and property maintenance costs such
as trash and snow removal are not listed as part of "original purchase price").
28 See N.Y. TAx LAW § 1440.7 (McKinney Supp. 1986). Mortgage foreclosures and con-
demnation proceedings (taking by eminent domain) are specifically included in section
1440.7 as "transfers of real property." See N.Y. TAx LAW §§ 1440.4, 1440.7. Development
rights are specifically included in the definition of "interest" and are therefore an interest
in real property subject to the gains tax. Id. § 1440.4; see Publication 588, supra note 13, at
22 (Q.63). Finally, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court has held that the debtor in a bankruptcy
proceeding is not exempt from liability for the gains tax. In re Jacoby Bender Inc., 758
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1985); see 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) (Supp. 1986).
27 See Publication 588, supra note 13, at 20 (Q.54). If a corporate merger results in a
controlling interest in an entity which owns real property in New York State the transfer
may be taxable under the gains tax. Id.
28 See id. (Q.53). In a non-liquidating dividend distribution in the form of unencumbered
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changes which are tax-free under section 1031 of the Internal
Revenue Code are taxable under the gains tax.2 9 Certain transac-
tions, however, are totally or partially exempt from the gains
tax.3 0 Transfers consisting of changes in the form of ownership
when there is no change in beneficial interest are examples of
transactions exempt from the gains tax.3 1
Consideration received by a transferor for the transfer of con-
tiguous or adjacent parcels of property is, in most cases,, aggre-
gated for purposes of the tax.3 2 Transfers pursuant to a coopera-
real property, the gains tax will not be due initially but will be due on any subsequent
transfer of the real property received as a dividend. Id. The gains tax, as measured by the
fair market value of the real property, will apply to liquidating dividend distributions
where the shareholders will hold individual title to separate parcels of real property of
equal value. Id.
29 See id. at 22 (Q.60). In a section 1031 exchange of property:
each party is the transferor of the property he is giving up, as well as the transferee
of the property received in the exchange. The consideration received is equal to the
fair market value on the date of exchange of the property received in the exchange,
plus any amount of cash and the value of any other property received in the ex-
change. The gain is the difference between the consideration received and the origi-
nal purchase price of the property exchanged.
Id.; see Board of Governors of the Real Estate Board of New York, Inc., Proposals For
Amendment of the New York State Real Property Gains Tax 13 (Jan. 1984).
30 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1443 (McKinney Supp. 1986). The gains tax is not applicable to
sales of real property when the consideration is less than one million dollars or when the
real property is occupied by the tranferor as his residence. Id. §§ 1443.1, 1443.2 (the latter
exemption applies only to the premises actually occupied and used for residential purposes
by the transferor); see Publication 588, supra note 13, at 1-2 (Q.7). A transfer is exempted
from the gains tax to the extent it "consists of a mere change of identity or form of owner-
ship or organization, where there is no change in beneficial interest." Id. The gains tax is
thus inapplicable to particular partnership and corporate transactions which are mere
changes of identity. Id. at 19 (Q.50). For a listing of other exemptions, see id. at 1-2 (Q.7).
"I N.Y. TAx LAW § 1443.5 (McKinney Supp. 1986); see Publication 588, supra note 13, at
19 (Q.50). Examples of such exempt transfers include: (1) the transfer of real property by
an individual to a partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership; (2) the trans-
fer by tenants-in-common of their interest in real property to a partnership, to be owned in
the same pro rata share as by the tenants-in-common; (3) the transfer of real property by a
corporation to its shareholders, who will hold the real property as tenants-in-common in
the same pro rata share as they own the corporation; (4) the transfer by a corporation to its
wholly owned subsidiary, from a wholly owned subsidiary to its parent, or from one wholly
owned subsidiary to another and; (5) the transfer by tenants-in-common of real property to
a corporation which the tenants own in the same pro rata share. Id. (Q.50(a)).
31 See Publication 588, supra note 13, at 15 (Q.42). Although separate deeds are used to
transfer adjacent property, they are treated as a single transfer of property. Id. The burden
is on the transferor to show that even though the properties are adjacent, they were not
used for a common purpose. Id.
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tive or condominium plan are also aggregated while transfers of
subdivided real property improved with residences are not.3 3 In
the case of partial or successive transfers not pursuant to a cooper-
ative or condominium plan, the gains tax is imposed when the ag-
gregate consideration paid exceeds one million dollars.3
With a few exceptions, before a deed may be recorded in New
York State, tranferors and tranferees must either file a tentative
tax assessment or an affidavit claiming an exemption. 5 A state-
ment of tentative assessment of the amount of tax due must be
supplied by the Department of Taxation and Finance within
twenty days after the filing of affidavits.36
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE GAINS TAX
The Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of legislative
enactments whenever possible.87 Only laws that interfere with fun-
damental constitutional rights or contain suspect classifications are
not presumed to be constitutional. 8 Classifications created by tax-
3 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1440.7 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
3 Id. § 1442; see also Publication 588, supra note 13, at 24 (Q.68).
35 N.Y. TAx LAW §§ 1447.1(l)(1)(ii), 1447.1(0(2) (McKinney Supp. 1986). A conveyance
of real property can be recorded if a sworn affidavit is filed that the transfer is for less than
$500,000. See id. § 1447.1(0(2).
A transferee must withhold consideration from the transferor in an amount sufficient to
pay the taxes determined from the tentative assessment. See id. § 1447.3(a). If a tentative
assessment of gains tax due has been issued by the New York State Department of Taxa-
tion and Finance, transferees who fail to withhold the required amount for the tax are held
personally liable if the tax is not paid by the transferor. Id. § 1447.3(a). See Publication
588, supra note 13, at 25-26 (Qs. 70(b), (c)).
36 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1447.2 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
37 See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982) (assumed legislatures act con-
stitutionally in equal protection questions); Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390
(1924) (statute must be construed to avoid any doubt of its constitutionality); Butler v.
Commonwealth, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 415 (1850) ("[A] law of one of the sovereign states
should never be . . . denominated [unconstitutional], if it can upon any other principle be
correctly explained.").
88 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 638-43 (1973). In Suga rman, the Court held that a New York Civil
Service Law allowing only United States citizens to hold permanent positions with the state
civil service was violative of the fourteenth amendment. 413 U.S. at 646. Classifications
based on alienage are suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Id. at 642. Similarly, in
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335-60 (1972), the Court held that to require a one year
residency requirement as a prerequisite to voting was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 405 U.S. at 352. Such requirements discriminated between old and new residents
of the state and created a suspect classification that penalized citizens who moved inter-
state. Id. at 334-35. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), a statute denying wel-
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ing enactments may be challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment" but, as examples of eco-
nomic or commercial legislation, they are upheld if the legislature
could have reasonably concluded that the statutory distinction
would promote a legitimate state purpose. 0 Thus, the states may
make reasonable classifications among groups for purposes of tax-
ation. 1 Since state legislatures possess such great freedom in de-
termining classifications,' 2 the burden rests on the challenger of a
tax statute to discredit any conceivable basis supporting the stat-
ute.4 3 As a result, the challenger of the constitutionality of a tax-
ing statute is at a distinct disadvantage."
The presumption of constitutionality, however, is a rebuttable
one. 5 The legislature's power in selecting classifications is not ab-
solute in that the equal protection demanded by the fourteenth
amendment forbids arbitrary classifications.' 6 Classifications based
on differences unrelated to the purpose of legislation violate the
fare benefits to those not residents of a state for one year was held unconstitutional as a
denial of equal protection. 394 U.S. at 627. The Court stated that the Constitution guaran-
tees citizens freedom of movement between states. Id. at 619. The argument that a one
year waiting requirement promotes state administrative efficiency by providing a ready
means of determining residency did not amount to a compelling state interest justifying the
statute. Id. at 636.
11 Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973) (quoting Allied
Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959)); Tax Comm'r v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527,
537-38 (1931) (duty of court is to question the classifications adopted by legislature);
Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Say. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293 (1898) (court must test reasona-
bleness of state's classification).
4o See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196, appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 801
(1983); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
41 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
4, See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
1" See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 535 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.); Borden's Farm
Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 203 (1934); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
" See supra notes 1-4, 37 & 40 and accompanying text.
,1 See Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934). The constitution-
ality which attaches to legislation is of a factual nature. Id. If rebutted, the legislation will
be subjected to constitutional attack. See Merit Oil v. State Tax Comm'n, 111 Misc. 2d 118,
120, 443 N.Y.S. 2d 604, 606 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1981); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas, 220 U.S. 61, 78-80 (1910); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 68
Misc. 2d 366, 375, 326 N.Y.S.2d 788, 798 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
,0 Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928) (classifications based on
"mere difference" do not satisfy Equal Protection Clause); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159 (1896).
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Equal Protection Clause."'
Recently, in Trump v. Chu"8 the constitutionality of the New
York gains tax was challenged. In Trump, real estate developers
maintained that the tax violated the Equal Protection Clauses of
the United States and New York State Constitutions by imposing
discriminatory classifications on those who transfer real property
for consideration over one million dollars and also upon condo-
minium and cooperative transferors. 9 In Trump, the New York
Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs' assertions that the court
should be guided by Stewart Dry Goods v. Lewis"° and Merit Oil v.
4' See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). Classifications
"must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id.
Similarly, in an earlier case the Court stated:
Classification for legislative purposes must have some reasonable basis upon which to
stand. It must be evident that differences which would serve for a classification for
some purposes furnish no reason whatever for a classification for legislative pur-
poses. The differences which will support class legislation must be such as in the
nature of things furnish a reasonable basis for separate laws and regulations. Thus
the Legislature may fix the age at which persons shall be deemed competent to con-
tract for themselves, but no one will claim that competency to contract can be made
to depend upon stature or color of the hair. Such a classification for such a purpose
would be arbitrary.
Gulf, Colo. & Sante Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155-56 (1897) (quoting State v. Loomis,
115 Mo. 307, 314, 22 S.W. 350, 351 (1893)).
In New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), the Supreme Court stated that it would
defer to a state's enactment of specific economic legislation unless the legislation violated a
fundamental right or was directed at a suspect class. Id. at 303. This is because the "judici-
ary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determinations in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect
lines." Id. Economic classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est to avoid strict judicial scrutiny. Id.
The Court has held statutes invalid as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause even
under the rational basis analysis. In Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), the Supreme
Court employed a rational basis analysis (not requiring strict scrutiny) to find that an
Alaska dividend distribution plan of state funds violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 60-61, 65. The Court analyzed the state legislature's purpose
in distributing dividends increasing with the number of years of a citizen's residence in the
state and concluded such a classification was not rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose. Id. at 65.
Also, in Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985), the Supreme
Court, applying a rational basis analysis, held that a New Mexico property tax exemption
for Vietnam veterans based on a durational residence requirement was invalid as violative
of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 2865-67.
48 65 N.Y.2d 20, 478 N.E.2d 971, 489 N.Y.S.2d 455, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 285
(1985).
49 Id. at 24, 478 N.E.2d at 974, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
50 Stewart Dry Goods v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935).
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State Tax Commission."
In Stewart, the Supreme Court overturned a revenue statute
where the amount of tax due was based on a merchant's gross
sales. -" The Court held that such a classification was arbitrary and
violated the Equal Protection Clause.53 In Merit, a New York State
Supreme Court overturned a gross receipts tax as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause of both the New York and United States
Constitutions." The tax was imposed on retailers who sold more
than sixty million gallons of petroleum in New York State, but
granted an exemption to those who sold less.5 5 The Court of Ap-
peals distinguished the gross receipts taxes in Stewart and Merit by
noting that both revenue taxes were imposed on gross sales, re-
gardless of profit, while the gains tax before the court was im-
posed only on the amount of gain, although initial tax liability was
determined by reference to gross consideration. 6 Under this rea-
soning, arbitrary classifications will survive so long as the statute
taxes profits and not gross receipts.'7 However, the Merit court
found the law unconstitutional because the statute treated mem-
bers within the same class unequally.' 8
" Merit Oil v. State Tax Comm'n, 111 Misc. 2d 118, 443 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1981).
" Stewart Dry Goods v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 566 (1935). The challenged statute in
Stewart levied a tax on the sales of retail merchants measured by the amount of gross sales.
Id. at 555. The rationale behind the tax was that those with greater sales were generally
earning a greater profit and this justified the classification. Id. at 557-58. The Stewart Court
noted that although profits increase with the amount of sales, there were so many excep-
tions to the general rule depending on the type of sales activity, that a classification could
not be justified on these grounds. Id. at 559. A tax based upon gross receipts was unfair
because it taxed transactions by their size and without regard to their profitability. See id. at
558-59.
I d. at 554, 557.
" Merit Oil v. State Tax Comm'n, 11 Misc. 2d 118, 443 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1981).
" Id. The Merit court objected to the way the statute treated members within the same
class of "retailers" by granting a total tax exemption to those retailers whose petroleum
sales were not above a certain volume. The Merit court noted that "legislation providing
for classifications based upon [sales] is constitutional except where ... all persons so en-
gaged are not treated alike." Id. at 120, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
"Trump, 65 N.Y.2d at 26, 478 N.E.2d at 976, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 460. The Trump court
viewed the holdings in Stewart and Merit as standing for the proposition that gross receipts
taxes that treat similarly situated taxpayers differently based on sales volume violate equal
protection simply because the taxes are imposed without regard to profits. Id.
"See supra note 56.
" Merit Oil v. State Tax Comm'n, 111 Misc. 2d 118, 120, 443 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606
(1981). The Merit court examined the gross profits tax and could "glean no rational basis
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It is submitted that, in spite of the New York court's decision in
Trump v. Chu, the Stewart Court's rationale is directly applicable to
the constitutionality of the gains tax. The Stewart Court rejected
the contention that a classification based on sales volume was justi-
fied because a merchant's ability to pay a tax increased with his
volume of sales.5" According to the Stewart Court, such a statutory
distinction discriminated in an unequal and arbitrary way between
persons similarly circumstanced. 0 However, the Trump court as-
serted the one million dollar classification based on gross consider-
ation, mandated by the gains tax, was rational because the state
legislature could have concluded that "generally speaking" profits
increase as the amount of gross consideration increases.61 Such
reasoning contradicts the Supreme Court's recognition in Stewart
that a merchant's profits do not necessarily increase with gross
sales.62 The New York gains tax allows those with identical gains
for the creation of a total exemption for those retailers selling less than 60,000,000 gallons
of petroleum, while fully taxing from 'dollar one' all profits... of those companies selling
more than said amount." Id.
59 Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 559 (1935). After thorough analysis,
the Stewart Court refused to accept such an argument that gross sales could reasonably
serve as the basis of a tax classification. Id. at 557. Instead, the Court found that:
gross sales of a merchant do not bear a constant relation to his net profits; that net
profits vary from year to year in the same enterprise; that diverse kinds of merchan-
dise yield differing ratios of profit; and that gross and net profits vary with the char-
acter of the business as well as its volume.
Id. at 558-59.
go Id. at 565-66. The Court noted that the Supreme Court had upheld classifications that
taxed chain stores at higher rates than single stores because the different form of organiza-
tion had inherent advantages. Id. at 565. However, the Court could find no basis for sus-
taining a classification founded solely on volume of business. Id. at 566. The Stewart Court
noted that the gross receipts tax "exacts from two persons different amounts for the privi-
lege of doing exactly similar acts because the one has performed the act oftener than the
other." Id.
" See Trump v. Chu, 65 N.Y.2d 20, 27, 478 N.E.2d 971, 976, 489 N.Y.S.2d 455, 460
(1985). The Trump court inaccurately quoted the Stewart opinion by stating that "generally
speaking" profits increase in proportion to an increase in gross consideration. Id. The Stew-
art Court accepted this finding, which was made by the district court, but further stated
that "itjhe ratio of increase, however, differs in different lines of activity and even as be-
tween concerns carrying on the same business, and so many exceptions and reservations
must be made that averages are misleading." Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S.
550, 559 (1935). The Trump court reasoned that so long as the statute taxed only net
gains, it would be rational for the legislature to conclude that profits will increase with
gross consideration. Trump, 65 N.Y.2d at 27, 478 N.E.2d at 976, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
62 See Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 558-59 (1935). The Stewart Court
criticized the trial court for not finding a relationship between gross sales and net profits
before upholding the gross receipts tax. Id. Similarly, the Trump decision was not based on
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to be taxed differently based on the consideration for the sale of
real property.6 4
Reasonable classifications are allowed in systems of taxation. 4
The Supreme Court has noted that "some injustice is bound to
result from any general rule of classification and equal protection
demands only reasonable uniformity in dealing with parties simi-
larly circumstanced. "6 5 It is submitted that the classifications en-
gendered by the New York gains tax lack such reasonable
uniformity.66
The Trump court upheld the one million dollar exemption on
the basis of administrative convenience. 67 Such a rationale can be
used by legislatures to establish classifications only if the classifica-
tion bears some reasonable relationship to the amount of the
tax.6 The Stewart Court, however, specifically rejected adminis-
trative convenience as a rationale for upholding arbitrary
taxation. 69
actual findings of a correlation between a greater amount of gross consideration and in-
creased profits in a real property transfer. See Trump v. Chu, 65 N.Y.2d 20, 27, 478
N.E.2d 971, 976, 489 N.Y.S.2d 455, 460 (1985).
See Trump, 65 N.Y.2d at 24, 478 N.E.2d at 974, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 458. The plaintiffs in
Trump pointed out that "[a] taxpayer who sells his property for $999,999 and has a gain of
$500,000 owes no tax whereas a taxpayer who sells his property for $1,000,001 and has a
similar $500,000 gain must pay a tax of $50,000." Id.
"See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
"Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 564 (1935).
See Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens Tax Council, Inc. for Appellants at 8, Trump v.
Chu, 65 N.Y.2d 20, 478 N.E.2d 971, 489 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1985). The classifications in the
New York gains tax are arbitrary because the purpose of the tax was to raise revenue.
However, the gains tax is triggered on transactions involving minimal profits while transac-
tions involving large gains are left untouched. A hypothetical seller could transfer a parcel
of real property in which he has a basis of $1,000,000 for $1,000,001. Under the New
York gains tax his one dollar of gain is subject to a ten percent levy. Another transferor
sells a parcel of real property with a basis of $100,000 for $999,999. His $899,999 gain is
tax exempt. Id. at 8.
67 See Trump v. Chu, 65 N.Y.2d 20, 27, 478 N.E.2d 971, 976, 489 N.Y.S.2d 455, 460
(1985).
" See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 511 (1937).
"" See Stewart, 294 U.S. at 560. "If the commonwealth desires to tax incomes it must take
the trouble equitably to distribute the burden of the impost. Gross inequalities may not be
ignored for the sake of ease of collection." Id. Cf. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230,
240 (1926) (arbitrary classification in taxation cannot be sustained because the legislature
found such classification a necessary aid in collecting inheritance taxes). But see Carmichael
v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 511 (1937). The Carmichael Court appeared to
hold a contrary view when that Court stated "[aldministrative convenience and expense in
the collection or measurement of the tax are alone a sufficient justification for the differ-
ence between the treatment of small incomes or small taxpayers and that meted out to
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The plaintiffs in Trump also contended that different tax classifi-
cations for cooperative and condominium developers and develop-
ers of subdivided parcels with improved residences were un-
constitutional.70 The court in Trump employed the following
rationalizations to support the legislature's different tax classifica-
tions for cooperative and condominium developers and developers
of subdivided realty: (1) condominium and cooperative develop-
ments involve greater administrative costs to the state because of
special laws; 1 (2) condominium and cooperative developments are
more likely to occur in urban areas, creating increased demands
on public services;72 (3) treating condominium and cooperative
sales as separate tax transactions involves greater administrative
expense than sales of subdivided realty;73 and (4) the classification
would encourage the development of individually owned resi-
dences and discourage the conversion of rental apartments to con-
dominiums and cooperatives.74 A New York Supreme Court has
recognized that "fanciful conjecture" cannot save a statute from
constitutional attack if facts are proven which show that a classifi-
cation is arbitrary. 5 It is submitted that since these judicial ratio-
nalizations are rebuttable, the Court of Appeals erred in uphold-
ing the New York gains tax.
The New York Attorney General already collects statutorily im-
posed fees for the filing of cooperative or condominium offering
statements which are designed to offset the state's administrative
costs."8 Also, cooperative and condominium developments are not
others." Id. (citations omitted). It is submitted that the Stewart and Carmichael cases are
reconcilable. In Stewart, there was no reasonable relation between gross receipts and net
gain. Stewart, 294 U.S. at 560. In Carmichael, the exclusion of employers of less than eight
employees was in fact reasonably related to the.amount of tax collectible. Carmichael, 301
U.S. at 511. This provided the legislature with a reasonable basis to conclude that monies
spent collecting the tax from the excluded class would not be recovered through its collec-
tion. Id.





"' See Society of Plastics Indus. v. City of New York, 68 Misc. 2d 366, 375, 326 N.Y.S.2d
788, 798 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
75 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352(e)(7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1986) which empowers the
New York Attorney General to collect fees on a sliding scale for cooperative or condomin-
ium plan offering statements. The legislative history behind Section 352(e)(7)(a) of the New
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only endemic to urban areas and there is no evidence these devel-
opments increase demands on public services." Furthermore, the
administrative costs for collecting the gains tax on condominium
and cooperative developments are the same as those for subdi-
vided real property7 8 and, realistically viewed, there is no evidence
that the challenged classification will slow down the conversion of
rental apartments to cooperatives and condominiums.79
III. PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE REVISION OF THE GAINS TAX
It is submitted that in its present form, the gains tax treats simi-
larly circumstanced individuals in a discriminatory and unfair
manner.80 Any proposal for legislative revision of the gains tax
should therefore focus on amending the current one million dol-
lar gross consideration exemption.81 Individuals with comparable
gains on real property transactions should be taxed at similar
rates.82 By making the imposition of the gains tax dependent on
the transferor's gain without regard to the amount of gross con-
sideration of a transfer, this disparity would be eliminated and the
financial well-being of the state would be enhanced.83
York General Business Law indicates these fees were intended to offset the State's regula-
tory costs in reviewing the plans. Memorandum of the Executive Chamber, N.Y. Gover-
nor's BillJacket, L. 1962, ch. 57, 7-8.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 20, 1984, § 8, at 1, col. I (development of condominium
community in Southhampton, N.Y.). N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1984, § 8, at 10, col. I (cooper-
ative projects in Montauk, New York); N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1984, at B7, col. I (new condo-
miniums being built in western Nassau County).
7' See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1447.1(e) (McKinney Supp. 1986). Unless the transaction is ex-
empt from the gains tax, the recording officer cannot accept a deed for filing in New York
State for either a condominium or a private home unaccompanied by a statement of tena-
tive assessment of gains tax due. N.Y. TAx LAW § 1447.1(0(1)(i), (ii) (McKinney Supp.
1986). No difference exists in the collection procedure for condominiums as opposed to
subdivided improved property. See id.
7' See Brief for Appellants at 14-15, Trump v. Chu, 106 S. Ct. 285 (1985). The extra
costs incurred by transferors due to the gains tax will be passed on to buyers without slow-
ing condominium or cooperative construction or conversion. Brief for Appellants at 17.
£0 See supra notes 61-63, 66 and accompanying text.
s See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
sI See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
so See Board of Governors of the Real Estate Board of New York, Inc., Proposals for
Amendment of the New York State Real Property Gains Tax 56 (Jan., 1984). The gains tax af-
fects the New York State economy adversely by discouraging continued real estate invest-
ment and development in the state. Id. Large financial institutions such as insurance com-
panies who administer pension funds and act in a quasi-fiduciary manner are the major
sources of financing for investment properties. Id. Since the gains tax may lower the profits
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CONCLUSION
The New York State gains tax is a complicated piece of legisla-
tion that unfairly discriminates between similarly circumstanced
individuals. The gains tax is triggered not by an individual's profit
on a transaction but by an arbitrarily set gross consideration
amount. Such an arbitrary classification scheme violates the Equal
Protection Clauses of the New York State and United States Con-
stitutions. Because the judiciary is unwilling to correct the dispari-
ties created by arbitrary classifications in the tax, the legislature
should amend the Act to make the amount of gain and not the
amount of gross consideration the trigger for imposition of the
tax. Further changes should be made to the gains tax to insure
that both residential and commercial construction activity and the
health of New York's economy are not inhibited.
Joan Ellsworth
of a property sale, these institutions would have difficulty justifying a New York project site
if one were available in another state which did not impose a levy on real property trans-
fers. Id. In addition, new construction projects are an investment risk. Id. at 4. These
projects become even more of a risk in New York because of the combined rates of New
York State and City corporate and individual income taxes. See id. (New York imposes
18.1% capital gains and 7.4% personal tax; Texas imposes none).
A high level of state construction activity produces sales tax revenue and benefits the
real estate tax assessment base. Id. Because of the present tax disparity imposed on cooper-
ative and condominium projects as opposed to subdivided real property, the gains tax in-
hibits the construction of new rental housing and cooperative and condominium develop-
ments. See supra note 83. Therefore, it is submitted that the present tax disparity imposed
on cooperative and condominium projects as opposed to subdivided real property should
be eliminated because it serves no rational purpose. See supra notes 65, 74-77 and accompa-
nying text; Trump v. Chu, 65 N.Y.2d at 28-32, 478 N.E.2d at 977-79, 489 N.Y.S.2d at
461-63 (Kane, J., dissenting). Critics of the gains tax therefore believe that it should be
amended to exclude all newly constructed residential properties from taxation. See Board
of Governor's Report, supra note 82, at 9; see also Memoranda of State Executive Depart-
ment of New York, reprinted in [1984] N.Y. Laws 3456 (McKinney).
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